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AGREEMENT.

Promise to pay Debt of Avother.-An agreement to forbear t6 sue is a
good consideration for the promise of a third person to pay the debt:
The Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank of Albany v. Wixon and others, 46
Barb.
Although the law, will not infer that any-forbearance was agreed to,
or intended, merely because a new note was taken for an old debt, yet
when the evidence establishes that such an agreement was made in connection with the making of a note having time to run, it will hold it to
be valid and binding,: Id.
CHARITY.

Bequestfor charitableuse.-A testator bequeathed the residue of his
estate to his executors in trust to hold and invest the same and the income thereof, and appropriate so much or the whole of the pfincipal or
,income as they might think proper "to the *furtherance and promotion
of the cause of piety and good morals, or in aid of objects and purposes
of benevolence or charity, public or private,' or temperance, or for the
education of deserving youths," and gave said trustees and their successors "full power, discretion, and authority to appropriate and expend
said income or capital in such manner as in their judgment may best
promote the objects above mentioned.'" Ield, that by " objects and purposes of benevolence or charity, public or private," the testator intended
generalrelief of the poor, either through public institutions or almsgiving by the agency of individuals; and that this was a good charitable bequest: 94altonstall and Others v. Sanders and Others, 11 Allen.
DAMAGES.

Building blown up to stay a Pire.-If,for the purpose of staying a
conflagration, a building has been blown up without right, the jury in
estimating the damages should consider the circumstances under which
the building and its contents were situated, and their 'chance of being
saved, even though the same were not actually on fire; and should
determine their value with reference to the peril to which they were
exposed: Parsons v. Pettingelland others, 11 Allen.
,S1ander.-In a case for slander, it is proper for the presiding judge
to instruct the jury, that, in the assessment of damages, they may take
into consideration the wealth of the defendant: -Humphriesv. Parker,
52 Me.
I From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter, to appear in vol. 11 of his Reports.
2 From Win. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 52 Maine Rep.
" From Hon. 0. L. Barboar, Reporter, to appear in vol. 46 of his Reports.
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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Resorting to -original lndebtedness.-Crelitorswho have taken a new
security, in the shape of promissory notes, upon extending the time of
paymen' of a debt, shall not, by an allegation of their own turpitude,
set aside the new security, and resort to the original indebtedness. Yet,
if the debtors themselves take the initiative in avoidance of the new
notes, as being usurious, either by defence in a suit unon them alone,
or in a suit upon the original security, the plaintiffs may recover upon
the original notes : The Winsted Bank, 46 Barb.
In an action upon promissory notes, made by the defendants, the complaint alleged that after said- notes matured, the same not being paid,
new notes were given for the same amount, and the time of payment
extended. That the defendants claimed that the new notes were usurious and void by reason of an illegal rate of interest beiug included in
them, and that the defendants therefore refused to pay them. And the
plaintiff demanded judgment for the amount of the original notes. The
defendants by their answer not only admitted that they claimed the new
notes to be usurious, but distinctly set up the usury as a part of their defence. On the trial, the plaintiff's counsel, in opening his case, set
forth the transaction as made by the pleadings, and admitted that the
new notes were usurious. Held, that the plaintiffs, under these circumstances, might resort to the original notes, and recover upon them:
Id.
DED.

Implied Covenant-Playground.-Ifthe granted premises in a deed
are described simply by courses and distances, and without reference to
visible monuments, except on one side, where they are bounded on a
new open street, and are further described as being lots marked on a
plan which is referred to, and on the plan it appears that a considerable
number of lots are laid down on one side of the street, and on the oppo.site side the land is marked "1Ornamental Grounds" and "Play Ground,"
without any designation of how much land is to be so appropriated,
there is no implied covenant that any land on the opposite side of the
street shall be so appropriated, although the grantor owned the same:
Lijit v. Goddard, 11 Alien.
Name of one of the M1akers not in Bod of the Deed.-W1"hen one,
jointly with others, signs, seals, and delivers an instrument supposed to
be a perfect deed, but his name appears in no other part thereof, his
intdrest in the premises described in such instrument is not thereby
conveyed: .Peabodyv. Hewett, 52 Me.
Consideraton.-If a consideration is expressed, in a conveyance, no
proof of its actual payment need be given; and though the amount be
merely nominal, that is sufficient: Webster v. Van Steenbergh, 46 Barb.
What will pass b~y.-Where the owner of land conveys the same by
an absolute conveyance, wine plants, set in the ground, and growing
there at the time, will pass by the conveyance, notwithstanding a parol
reservation thereof by the grantor: Wintermute v. Lfight, 46 Barb.
DOWER.
.11omentary seisin-Jlortyage by Grantee immediately on Conveyance.
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-If at the same time that a deed of land is received tfl..
gnnt'e mortgages it to a third person for the purpose of procuring money to enable
himself to obtain his deed, and as a part of the same transaction, his
seisin is only instantaneous, and the mortgage will bar his wife's dower.
although she does nut sign it: King v. Stetson & another. il Allen.
EJECTMENT.

Eguftable Title.-Where the plaintiff has, at most, a mere equitable
title to the piece of land the possession of which he seeks to recover, no
action will lie : Peck v. Newton, 46 Barb.
*An action in which no equitable interest in the premises is set up in
the complaint, and no equitable relief is demanded-the plaintiff, suing
as trustee of -a school district, alleging therein that the district has lawful title as the owner in fee simple-so that the possession is not sought
as incidental to a specific performance, or other equitable relief, but the
plaintiff counts upon his title, and demands judgment for the possession
of the premises, cannot be maintained: Id.
An action to recover the possession of real estate will. not lie against
a stranger -inpossession, in favor of a plaintiff resting not on a legal but
a mere equitable title: Id.
EVIDENCE.

Bandwrting-Experts.-Au expert in handwriting, having testified
that, several years since, he carefully examined, and now has a recollection of three signatures purporting to be the signatures of S., and
acknowledged by him to -be genuine; that he never saw S. write, and
should not feel able to testify to S.'s signature, without a comparison
with other writings; may, after examining another signature presented
purporting to be the signature of S., give his opinion whethei or not
the signature in question is in the' same handwriting as the three
acknowledged to be genuine: Woodrnan v. Dana, 52 Me.
No witness, except an expert, is competent to give an opinion simply
by comparison of hands by juxtaposition, and this is done by the production of the standard in open court: Id.
Non-experts can only give opinions in eases where they have previous
acquaintance or knowledge ofthe handwriting by which the genuineness
of the controverted specimen is to be tested. And, in this case, the
standard need not be present: Rd.
An expert need have no previous acquain'tance or knowledge of his
standard to authorize him to express an opinion by comparison: Id.
A non-expert cannot express an opinion without such previous
acquaintance or knowledge: Id.
Presumption of Death.-Absence of a party for seven years or more
from any place does not raise a presumption of his death, unless it is
shown that he had a previous established residence at that place-:
tinc1'field v. Emerson, 52-Me.
And where a title is claimed to be in the father, because of the death
of his son, not only the death of the son must be shown but also that
he died without issue: Id.
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FRAUD.

Execution on Real Estate conveyed by Debtor.-Under our statutes,
a creditor may levy upon real estate, which the debtor, having had the
legal title thereto, has fraudulently conveyed: Ball v. Sands, 52 31e.
Such land may be- attached, as well inactions of tort as of contract,
and held as against subsequent conveyances: Id.
The plaintiff in an action of tort becomes a creditor, when he recovers
his judgment: Id.
By the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, a fraudulent conveyance, for a valuable
consideration, is void as to all persons liable or intended to be injured
thereby: d.
And if it is both fraudulent and voluntary, so as to raise the presumption of a secret trust, it is a continuing fraud, and void both as to
existing and subsequent creditors: Id.
A fraudulent conveyance, for a sufficient consideration, is void as to
subsequent creditors, only when it was made for the purpose of defrauding them: Id.
A plaintiff in an action of tort, attaching real estate which the defendant bad previously mortgaged, can avoid the mortgage only by showing
that it was fraudulent as (o him : id.
In such a case, an instruction to the jury, "that, if the mortgage was
fraudulent, it could only be avoided, on that ground, by the then existing creditors of the grantor," is erroneous: Id.
If such mortgage was intended to delay or defraud subsequent creditors, it is voidable as to them; and the question of fraudulent interest is
one offart for the jury: Id.
HIGHWAY.

Right of Municipal Corporatiouto lay out a way for access to Scevery.-The selectmen of a town have authority to lay out a town way
wholly upon land of citizens, against their consent, entering their land
'from a highway and returning to it at about the same place where it
enters, and leading to no other way or landing-place, and capable of
being used for no purposes of business or duty, or of access to the land
of any other person; and which is laid out with the design to provide
access not for the town merely, but for the public, to points or places
in the lands of those citizens, esteemed as pleasing natural scenery:
Rigginson and others v. Inhabitants of Nahant, 11 Allen.
INSURANCE.

Breach of Conditions of Policy-Forfeiture-Actsof Agent.-A forfeiture of a policy of insurance is to be construed strictly; and its
enforcement is not to be favored: North Berwick Co. v. N. E. . & M.
Ins. Co., 52 Me.
The act of receiving an additional premium for a variation of the risk
after the existence of facts which would authorize a forfeiture had
become known to the insurers, must, in the absence of fraud and concealment, be regarded as a waiver of the forfeiture : i.
From the answer to a question in an application, that the factory
insured is "worked iually" certain specified hours in the (lay time "in
the suuinir," and certain specified hours "in the winter-slrt time
now," it m:ay be inferrea that it was expected at times the fiaetory would
be run nihts : Id.
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Where an agent, by the power of attorney appointing him, was
authorized to "make insurance by policies of"-the defendant company,
"to renew the same, and to indorse upon policies issued by him permission to the assured to vary the risk, according to the rules and
instructions he shall from time to time receive from said company, and
all policies, issued by said agent, shall be to all intents valid and binding
upon said company ;" and, upon the receipt of an additional premium,
fixed by him, such agent varied the risk by a written permission to run
the factory insured "day and night," until the expiration of the policy
without prejudice;" and the factory was burned in the night :-Held,
that in the absence of any proof that the agent had violated any rules
or regulations he may have received from the company, the permit to
run nights was binding on the company, and the agent had ample
power to waive such previous running which had come to his know4..
ledge:
When the plaintiffs procured a policy oq their merchandise in their
storehouse, and another on their factory; and the former contained a
provision that, "if the risk be increased by any meeas whatever within
the control of the assured," it should be void, but no limitation as to the
time the plaintiffs were to run their factory; but such limitation was
contained in the latter; and, subsequently, such limitation was removed
by the written permit of the defendants in consideration of an additional
premium :-Held, that the policies were distinct and independent; and
the removing of the limitation was not an "increase of the risk," within
the meaning of the former policy: I.
It is no objection that only a: few, and not all, of the letters comprising a correspondence between the parties, are offered in evidenbe: Id.
JUDGMENT..

Notice to Defendant.-No court can rightfully render judgment in
a cause, until it has acquired complete jurisdiction over the parties, the
subject-matter of the suit, and, the process: Penobscot R. R. Co. v.
Weeks, 52 Me.
Such jurisdiction is not acquired until the defendant is in some way
notified of the pendency of the suit: 1d.
If, upon inspection of the record, a judgment, by whatever court
rendered, and by whatever means brought in question, appears to have
been rendered without such notice, it is absolutely void for such purposes: .1d.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Wine-plants, growing upon a farm, are,. as between landlord and
tenant, personal property, and the latter has .a right to remove them:
Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb.
If the tenant executes a mortgage upon such plants, the same is valid
as between the parties to it, and will enable the mortgagee, by foreclosure aid sale, to acquire the mortgagor's right of removal: Id.
LiMITATONS, STATUTE OF.

Effect of a Pam-ent.-The law respecting the effect of a payment, on
a question as to taking a case out of the operation -of the Statute of
Limitations, has not been changed by the code of procedure. And the
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language of the authorities is, that a payment which will take a case
out of the operation of this statute, must be made under circumstances
to warrant a finding, as a question of fact, that the debtor intended to
recognise the debt in question as subsisting, and which he was willing
to pay: Xiller v. Talcot, 46 Barb.
LOST GOODS.

Right of Owner of place where found, as against Finder.-A stranger
in a shop who first sees a pocket-book which has been accidentally left
by another upon a table there, is not authorized to take and hold possession of it, as against the shopkeeper: McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen.
MANDAMUS.
- Removal

ofAttorveyfiom the Rolls of Court.-This courtwill not issue
a writ of mandamus directing the superior court to restore an attorney
at law whom they have removed from practice, although such removal
was made without any previous written charge .of misconduct against
him, and without any summons or other process to bring him before the
court; especially if it appears that in fact he had notice of proceedings
in that court, and appeared. therein, and had ample time allowed to him,
and a fall hearing on the merits, and that, on the facts found by the
court, the removal was proper, and that after alleging exceptions to the
judgmnent of removal, which were disallowed by that court on the
ground that the subject-matter was not open to exception, he omitted
to prosecute them in this court, by proving them under Gen. Sts. c. 115,
§ 11: Randall, PetitionerJbr.Mandamus,11 Allen.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION.

Liabilitiesfor Negligence of Officers.-The cases Xitchell v. Rockland, 41 Me. 863, and 45 Me. 504, re-affirmed: Mitchell v. Rockland;
52 Me.
The consent of the owners of a vessel to the appropriation of it for a,
hospital, by the health officers of a town, does not render the'town liable
for any injuries caused by the negligence of such officers, while they
are in possession of it: Id.
Neither the relation of master or servant, nor of principal and agent,
exists between a town and its health or police officers; nor is the town
liable for their unlawful or negligent acts: Id.
As a general rule, municipal corporations are not liable to a suit,
except when the right of action is given by statute: Id.
It seems that a city government cannot legally ratif the negligent,
careless, or tortious acts of their officers, knowing them to be such, so
as to make the city liable therefor: Id.
The payment of a bill by a city government to one employed by the
health officers, is no evidence that the city government had knowledge
that the services, for which the payment is made, were so negligently
performed as to injure others; or that the negligent acts of such emplhyee
were approved or sanctioned: ]d.
NEGLIGENCE.

Sale of Dangerous Article.--The sale of an article in itself harmless,
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and which becomes dangerous only by being used in combination with
some other article, without any knowledge by the vendor that it is to be
used in such combination, does not render him liable to an action by
one who purchases the article from the original vendee, and who is
injured while using it in dangerous combination with another article;
although by mistake the article actually sold is different from that which
is intended to be sold: Davidson v. Nichols and Another, 11 Allen.
NEw TRIAL.
Interested ."uror.-A party seeking a new trial, by reason of interest
in a juror, should negative his knowledge of such interest: Jameson v.
Androscoggin R. R. Co., 52 Me.
A simple denial of such knowledge, made in the motion, omitting to
negative such knowledge on the part of his counsel, unaccompanied by
any affidavit or other proof establishing the truth of such denial, is not
sufficient to warrant the court to set aside the verdict: id.
PRINCIPAL. AND SURETY.

Discharge of Surety bnjForbearance to sue.-Forbearance by a
creditor, without any binding agreement to refrain from taking proceedings, will not exonerate a surety. There must be a valid consideration
for the agreement, and such as will preclude the creditor from enforcing
payment against the surety until the expiration of the time specified:
Van Rensselaer v. Kirkpatrick, 46 Barb.
Where an agreement was made between. the maker and holder of
promissory notes that the former should pay the latter weekly instalments upon the notes until the same should be paid, and that he would
assign an account against the county, which had not yet become due,
without any new note being given or new security actually taken; and
the holder thereupon agreed that if the maker paid as he proposed, and
continued to do so, he would not trouble the indorser: Reld,that there
being no valid consideration for the agreement to extend the time of
payment, the terms of the original contract between the maker and the
holder of the notes were not changed, and the indorser was not discharged: id.
Reld, also, that the payment bf a single instalment, by the maker, was
but a partial execution of the contract, and only the payment of what
was actually due; and that it could not be regarded either as a con'sideration for extending the time, or as the actual full execution of the
agreement: Id.
STEAMBOATS.

Redress for Injuries to Passengers.--The Act of Congress, passed
August 30th 1852, entitled "An act to amend an act entitled ' an act
to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of
vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for other purposes,"
was intended to provide additional guards and securities for passengers
who might embark upon steam-vessels, without exempting the owners
from the liabilities imposed by the legal relationship which existed
between them and passengers: Swarthout v. The New Jersey Steamboat Company, 46 Barb.
The regulations contained in the act did not supersede, and were not
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:ntendcd to quperscde the redress which the common law extended to
aggrieved parties, for injuries received:
Accordingly, a certificate made by an officer of the government, showing that the boilers of a steamboat have been properly inspected as
directed by the Act of Congress, and showing a compliance with the
provisions of the act, by the owners, will not exonerate such owners from'
liability, in an action brought by a passenger, to recover damages for a
personal injury occasioned by the explosion of a boiler: Id.
In such an action the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for his
bodily pain and suffering: Id.
TENDER. '

What is sufilcient.-In order to constitute a valid tender, it must be
proved that there was a production of the money, and an actual offer of
it to the creditor; unless it be shown that the latter dispensed with it
by some positive act or declaration: Strong v. Blake et al., 46 Barb.
It is not enough that the debtor had the money in his pocket, and
informed his creditor that he was ready to pay, without offering to do
so; nor that he retained it in an envelope which was shown to, or
shaken at the creditor. There must be an actual offer or presentation of
the money, so that the creditor can take it : Id.
Waiver of.7-Where a creditor, on being informed by a person that he
had come to make a tender, referred him to his attorney, saying his
office was open and it was but a step, without however refusing to receive the money, or interposing any objection, or- intimating in any way
that the presentation of the money was not required: Bald that this
did not amount to a waiver of the production and offer of the money: d.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Demand of P1ice.-Upon a sale of barley, by M. to D., for cash on
delivery at the storehouse of G., it was agreed the money should be
left. by D. with G. to pay the price. The purchaser did not attend in
person to the receiving and measuring of the grain, but hid a clerk or
agent there for that purpose :-Held, that a demand of the money of
such clerk or agent was sufficient: and that it was not necessary for the
vendor to go in search of the purchaser himself, to make the demand
of him: Morgan v. Gregg, 46 Barb.
Reld, also, that the clear intent of the 'contract was, that the money
should be at the place of delivery; and if it was not there, the purchaser was in default; unless the vendor waived that condition. That
whether he waived it or not, depended on his intent at the time of the
delivery; and that was a question of fact for the jury: Id.
Admixture--Tenants in Common.-Beld, further, that the fact that
the grain was, as the same was delivered from day to day, at the storehouse of G., put into bins in which other barley of D. was being put, at
the same time, was not such an admixture of the grain as to make the
owners thereof tenants. in common; no such tenancy being contemplated,
and the admixture being for no such purpose: Id.
And that M. notwithstanding the admixture of the barley delivered
by him, with barley delivered by others, did not lose his ownership, but
remained owner of the quantity delivered. as though it had not been so

